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1Self-Organization in Decentralized Networks: A
Trial and Error Learning Approach
Luca Rose, Student Member, IEEE, Samir M. Perlaza, Member, IEEE, Christophe J. Le Martret, Senior
Member, IEEE, and Me´rouane Debbah, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, the problem of channel selection and
power control is jointly analyzed in the context of multiple-
channel clustered ad-hoc networks, i.e., decentralized networks
in which radio devices are arranged into groups (clusters) and
each cluster is managed by a central controller (CC). This
problem is modeled by game in normal form in which the
corresponding utility functions are designed for making some
of the Nash equilibria (NE) to coincide with the solutions to a
global network optimization problem. In order to ensure that
the network operates in the equilibria that are globally optimal,
a learning algorithm based on the paradigm of trial and error
learning is proposed. These results are presented in the most
general form and therefore, they can also be seen as a framework
for designing both games and learning algorithms with which
decentralized networks can operate at global optimal points
using only their available local knowledge. The pertinence of the
game design and the learning algorithm are highlighted using
specific scenarios in decentralized clustered ad hoc networks.
Numerical results confirm the relevance of using appropriate
utility functions and trial and error learning for enhancing the
performance of decentralized networks.
Index Terms—Ad-hoc networks, Resource allocation, Interfer-
ence management, QoS provisioning, Game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
A decentralized self-configuring network (DSCN) is an
infrastructure-less network in which transmitters communicate
with their respective receivers without the control of a central
authority, for instance, a base station. The relevance of these
networks lies on the fact that a formal network planning is
not required, their deployment is easy, quick and, more impor-
tantly, capabilities such as self-healing and self-configuration
are often present. Therefore, DSCNs span a large number
of applications including military, law enforcement, disaster
relief, space, and indoor/outdoor commercial applications [1],
[2].
A growing body of research suggests that self-organization
is one of the fundamental capabilities decentralized networks
Manuscript received March 5, 2012; revised September 5, 2013; accepted
October 13 2013.
L. Rose is with the Alcatel-Lucent chair in Flexible radio, Supe´lec, Plateau
du Moulon, 91192, Gif-sur-Yvette, France and with Thales Communications
& Security, avenue des Louvresses, 92622, Gennevilliers, France (e-mail:
(luca.rose@supelec.fr).
S.M. Perlaza is with the School of Engineering and Applied Science at
Princeton University, New Jersey, USA. (e-mail: perlaza@princeton.edu).
C. J. Le Martret is with Thales Communications & Security,
avenue des Louvresses, 92622, Gennevilliers, France (e-mail:
christophe.le martret@thalesgroup.com).
M. Debbah is with the Alcatel-Lucent chair in Flexible radio,
Supe´lec, Plateau du Moulon, 91192, Gif-sur-Yvette, France (e-mail: mer-
ouane.debbah@supelec.fr).
must exhibit [3]–[8]. The term self-configuration refers to
the capability of radio devices to autonomously tune their
transmit-receive configuration for efficiently exploiting the
available resources and guaranteeing network reliability. In
the most general case, a transmit-receive configuration can
be described in terms of the number of information bits per
block, the block length, the codebook, the encoding-decoding
functions, the channel selection policy, the power allocation
policy, etc., as suggested in [9]–[11].
This paper focuses exclusively on the self-configuration
dimension of these networks and more specifically, on the case
of multiple-channel clustered ad hoc networks, i.e., DSCNs in
which radio devices are arranged into groups (clusters) and
each cluster is managed by a central controller (CC). The
main task of the CC is to choose the logical channel in which
its cluster must operate and to determine the power levels to
be used by all radio devices inside the cluster. Hence, this
network model is both decentralized, in the sense that there
exist several CCs autonomously taking decisions, and also
centralized, in the sense that radio devices inside a cluster
implement the decision adopted by their corresponding CC.
The decision-taking problem faced by all CCs is modeled by
a game in normal form and the corresponding utility functions
are designed for making some of the Nash equilibria (NE) to
coincide with the solutions to a global network optimization
problem. That is, the utility functions are designed to make
some of the equilibria to be global optimal operating points.
In order to ensure that the network operates in those equilibria
that are globally optimal, a learning algorithm based on the
paradigm of trial and error learning [12] is proposed. The
main characteristics of the proposed algorithm are studied and
interesting conclusions in terms of time to reach a globally
optimal NE are presented. Interestingly, the results presented
here are introduced in the most general form in order to
provide not only a solution to the problem described above but
also to provide a general framework for designing both games
and learning algorithms with which decentralized networks
can operate at global optimal points using only their available
local knowledge about the network.
The use of game theory [13] and multi-agent learning
[12] is already well accepted in the analysis of this kind
of problems. The following sub-section highlights the most
relevant contributions in this sense.
A. State of the Art
Among the most relevant contributions regarding the main
results of this paper, it is worth to highlight those in [14]–
2[23]. In [14], the authors consider a clustered multi-channel
ad hoc network in which clusters are able to sense all
available channels in order to choose an interference-free
channel. When an interference-free channel is not available,
the choice on the channel is randomly made. In low population
density networks, this behavioral rule is shown to exhibit
an acceptable performance with very little implementation
complexity. Nonetheless, in high population-density networks,
this approach is also shown to be highly suboptimal. Other
approaches are based on the use of the iterative water-filling
(IWF) power allocation policy [15]–[17]. For instance, in
[15], the authors prove that the IWF algorithm converges to
an operating point that guarantees a given transmission rate
while minimizing the transmit power. Such a convergence
is subject to the assumption that the system operates in
the weak interference regime. In [24]–[26], it is shown that
in decentralized networks the operating point achieved by
using IWF is often inefficient. To overcome this inefficiency,
solutions based on the cooperation of all transmitters are
proposed in [27]–[29]. Among other approaches, including
those based on reinforcement learning, maximum-entropy
reinforcement learning, smoothed best-response or fictitious
play, it is important to highlight the contributions in [3], [7],
[8], [18]–[23]. The main drawbacks of these contributions can
be summarized in five points: (i) The converging point is a
probability distribution over the set of all available channels
and power allocations policies [21], [22], [30], [31]. Therefore,
the optimization is often on the expectation of the performance
metric and the optimality is often claimed in the asymptotic
regime. (ii) Often, optimal performance is claimed only in
the case in which the number of available channels is higher
than the number of devices [20]; (iii) The results are not
general as often algorithms are designed for a particular
metric, e.g., the transmission rate [4], [7], [8]; (iv) The
channel selection problem is treated separately from the power
allocation problem [19], [20]; or (v) only the power control
problem is considered [23].
B. Structure of the Paper
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Sec. II introduces
the system model and describes a game in normal form that is
used as reference to present the main results. Sec. III briefly
describes the trial and error algorithm as introduced in [32].
Sec. IV establishes a connection between the stochastically sta-
ble points of the TE algorithm, the NE of the game cited above
and the solutions to a global network optimization problem.
Sec. V presents some simulation results in oder to highlight
some heuristic improvements that can be implemented to the
classical TE algorithm. Sec. VI concludes this work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section describes the network model and a centralized
network optimization problem whose solutions are assumed to
be the desirable network operating points. Later, this section
introduces a game in normal form whose utility function is
designed for making its Nash equilibria to coincide with the
solutions of the network optimization problem.
A. System Model
Consider a DSCN in which all its nodes coexist within
the same spectrum subject to mutual interference. Nodes are
arranged into groups, referred to as cells. Each cell is con-
trolled by a CC that harmonizes the intra-cell communications
by strategically choosing a channel (frequency band) and a
power level to be used by all the nodes in the corresponding
cell. This model represents either networks in which all nodes
are interested in communicating with the same receiver (e.g.,
the CC acts also as a receiver) or networks in which the
CC manages several point-to-point communications inside the
cell. Let K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} be a set of K cells. Let also
Lk = {ℓ1,k, ℓ2,k, . . . , ℓk,Lk} denote the set of Lk links within
cell k, with k ∈ K. The set of all the links in the network is
denoted by L = ∪k∈KLk, with L = |L| the total number of
links in the network.
Let C = {1, 2, . . . , C} be the set of C channels into
which the total spectrum is divided. All channel gains are
assumed to be time invariant for the whole duration of one
transmission. Cell k uses only one channel denoted by ck ∈ C
and a transmit power level pk that is chosen from a finite set
P = {0, . . . , Pmax} of Q = |P| power levels. The maximum
transmittable power level is denoted by Pmax and it is assumed
to be the same for all cells. A pair of a channel and a power
level is referred to as an action, i.e, ak = (ck, pk) ∈ A,
where A = C × P is the set of actions. The super vector
describing the whole network configuration is denoted by
a = (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ A × . . . × A = AK , and it is often
referred to as an action profile.
The goal is to design a fully decentralized algorithm that
selects a network configuration vector a∗ ∈ AK that is a
solution of the following optimization problem
 maxa∈AK
K∑
k=1
ϕk(a)
s.t. ξℓ(a) > Γ ∀ℓ ∈ L∗.
(1)
The function ϕk : AK → [0, 1] determines the performance
ϕk(a) achieved by the cell k when the actions chosen by
all cells correspond to the action profile a. The function
ξℓ(·) : AK → [0, 1] represents the QoS constraints to which
link ℓ is subject. The set L∗ ⊆ L is defined as the largest set
of links for which the constraints in (1) can be simultaneously
satisfied. Note that L∗ depends on all the individual constraints
that are autonomously determined by each link. Thus, not
all the constraints might be simultaneously satisfiable. Fixing
the set L∗ is a mathematical maneuver in order to guarantee
that the optimization domain in (1) is not empty. Later, it
is shown that there is no loss of generality by assuming
the set L∗ to be known in advance. The formulation in (1)
might describe a large set of network optimization problems
that do not necessarily need to be convex. For instance, by
properly selecting the functions ϕk and ξℓ, it is possible to
analyze problems such as: (a) the throughput maximization
problem subject to particular delay constraints; (b) the transmit
power minimization subject to a particular network reliability
constraint; and other problems.
3Here, the final goal is to design a decentralized behavioral
rule that allows the network to achieve an operating point a∗
that is a solution of (1) based only on local intra-cell available
information.
B. Game Theoretical Modeling
This sub-section introduces a game in normal form
G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
, (2)
that models the problem described in Sec. II. The set K
represents the players, i.e., the K central controllers in the
network; the set A represents the individual actions of all
players. Note that all players have the same set of actions. An
action of player k, denoted by ak = (ck, pk) ∈ A = C×P , is a
pair made of a channel index (frequency band) and the transmit
power level to be used by all links inside the corresponding
cell. The utility function of player k is uk : AK → [0, 1] and
it is defined as
uk(a) =
1
1 + βLmax
(
ϕk(a) + β
∑
ℓ∈Lk
1{ξℓ(a)>Γ}
)
(3)
where β is a design parameter that tunes the tradeoff between
the number of links that can be satisfied
∑
ℓ∈Lk
1{ξℓ(a)>Γ},
and the maximization of the function ϕk. The utility function
in (3) is a generalization of the utility function proposed in
[33]. More importantly, it is chosen such that it exhibits several
useful properties. First, it is monotonically increasing with
both the number of links that are able to satisfy their individual
constraints inside the corresponding cell k; and with the value
of the function ϕk that determines the global performance of
cell k. Second, as shown in Sec. IV, for a particular choice of
the parameter β, there exists an algorithm whose stochastically
stable points are both equilibria of the game G and solutions
of the optimization problem in (1).
The notion of equilibrium used in the following of this
analysis is that proposed by Nash in [34].
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium in pure strategies). An action
profile a∗ ∈ AK is an NE of the game G if ∀k ∈ K and
∀a′k ∈ A
uk(a
∗
k,a
∗
−k) ≥ uk(a
′
k,a
∗
−k). (4)
The motivation for adopting the NE as the solution concept of
the game G relies on the fact that at an NE, the action adopted
by every player is optimal with respect to the choices made by
all the other players. That is, if a player k decides to deviate
from its individual NE action, its utility can only be degraded
if the system is at such NE. Therefore, from a decentralized
point of view, this property is particularly desirable.
In the case the game G possesses several equilibria, they can
be compared by calculating their corresponding sum-utility,
i.e., the sum of the utilities obtained by all players at the
corresponding equilibrium. Therefore, the rest of this analysis
focuses on those NE that are maximizers of the social welfare
function W : AK → R defined by W (a) =
∑K
k=1 uk(a).
III. TRIAL AND ERROR LEARNING ALGORITHMS
The purpose of this section is threefold. First, it provides
a brief description of the trial and error (TE) algorithm as
introduced in [12] and [32]; second, it describes the adaptation
of this algorithm to the game described in Sec. II-B; finally,
it introduces some heuristic enhancements to optimize the
convergence properties.
A. Trial and Error Learning Algorithm
The TE learning algorithm can be described by a state
machine locally implemented by each player. The main feature
of this state machine is that the set of stochastically stable
states are the NE that maximize the social welfare.
At each iteration t, the state of player k is defined by the
triplet:
Zk(t) = {mk(t), a¯k(t), u¯k(t)} , (5)
where mk(t) ∈ {C,C+, C−, D} represents the mood: content
(C), hopeful (C+), watchful (C−), discontent (D), a¯k(t) ∈ A
and u¯k(t) ∈ [0, 1] represent the benchmark action and bench-
mark utility, respectively. The state machine transitions and
behavior are detailed hereunder. Note that the notation a⇐ b
indicates that variable a takes the value of variable b.
Content: Let ǫ ∈ [0, 1] be an experimentation parameter and
assume that the state of player k at time t− 1 is Zk(t− 1) =
{C, a¯k(t− 1), u¯k(t− 1)}. Then, at iteration t, it selects its
action according to the following rule: with probability (1 −
ǫ), it plays the benchmarked action ak(t) = a¯k(t − 1) or
with probability ǫ, it plays another action randomly selected
ak(t) 6= a¯k(t − 1). Once player k has played action ak(t), it
observes the value of its utility function uk(t).
The player updates its state as follows: If ak(t) 6= a¯k(t−1)
and uk(t) ≤ u¯k(t − 1), then Zk(t) ⇐ Zk(t − 1); If
ak(t) 6= a¯k(t − 1) and uk(t) > u¯k(t − 1), then, with
probability ǫG(uk(t)−u¯k(t−1)), it sets mk(t) ⇐ mk(t − 1),
a¯k(t) ⇐ ak(t) and u¯k(t) ⇐ uk(t), while with probability(
1− ǫG(u
′
k(t)−u¯k(t−1))
)
, it sets Zk(t) ⇐ Zk(t − 1); If
ak(t) = a¯k(t− 1) and uk(t) ≥ u¯k(t− 1) then, mk(t)⇐ C+,
a¯k(t) ⇐ a¯k(t − 1), u¯k(t) ⇐ u¯k(t − 1); If ak(t) = a¯k(t − 1)
and uk(t) < u¯k(t− 1) then mk(t)⇐ C−, a¯k(t)⇐ a¯k(t− 1),
u¯k(t)⇐ u¯k(t− 1).
Note that if player k does not experiment (it plays its
benchmarked action) and its utility increases, then it becomes
hopeful, while if it decreases, it becomes watchful. Here, the
function G : R→ R must be such that:
0 ≤ G(x) <
1
2
. (6)
Numerical simulations suggest that a linear formulation such
as: G(∆u) = −0.2∆u + 0.2, with ∆u = uk(t) − u¯k(t − 1),
performs well under several scenarios.
Hopeful: Assume that the state of player k at time t− 1 is
Zk(t−1) = {C+, a¯k(t− 1), u¯k(t− 1)}. Then, at iteration t, it
plays the benchmark action ak(t) = a¯k(t− 1) and it observes
the value of its utility function uk(t). If uk(t) ≥ u¯k(t − 1)
then, mk(t)⇐ C, a¯k(t)⇐ a¯k(t− 1) and u¯k(t)⇐ u¯k(t− 1);
otherwise, mk(t) ⇐ C−, a¯k(t) ⇐ a¯k(t − 1) and u¯k(t) ⇐
u¯k(t− 1).
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Zk(t−1) = {C−, a¯k(t− 1), u¯k(t− 1)}. Then, at iteration t, it
plays the benchmark action ak(t) = a¯k(t− 1) and it observes
the value of its utility function uk(t). If uk(t) > u¯k(t − 1),
then mk(t)⇐ C+, u¯k(t)⇐ u¯k(t−1) and a¯k(t)⇐ a¯k(t−1);
otherwise, mk(t) ⇐ D, u¯k(t) ⇐ u¯k(t − 1) and a¯k(t) ⇐
a¯k(t− 1).
Discontent: Assume that the state of player k at time t− 1
is Zk(t − 1) = {D, a¯k(t− 1), u¯k(t− 1)}. Then, at iteration
t, it randomly selects an action ak(t) and observes the value
of its utility function uk(t). The state is updated as follows:
with probability p = ǫF (uk(t)) it sets mk(t) ⇐ C, u¯k(t) ⇐
uk(t) and a¯k(t)⇐ a¯k(t− 1); with probability (1− p) it sets
mk(t)⇐ D, u¯k(t)⇐ uk(t) and a¯k(t)⇐ ak(t). The function
F : R→ R must be such that
0 ≤ F (u) <
1
2K
. (7)
Numerical simulations suggest that a linear formulation such
as: F (u) = − 0.2
K
u+ 0.2
K
performs well under several scenarios.
In [12] and [32], the authors proved that the stochastically
stable action profiles of the trial and error algorithm (i.e.,
action profiles that are played most of the time) are those
NE that maximize the social welfare. Theorem 1 restates their
main results.
Theorem 1 Let G have at least one pure NE and let each
player use TE. Then, for each ǫ small enough there exists a
δ such that a pure Nash equilibrium that maximizes the sum
utility among all equilibrium states is played (1− δ) fraction
of the time.
Theorem 1 states that if all players implement the TE algo-
rithm and there exists at least one NE, then the NE with the
highest social welfare is played during a large fraction of the
time. In general, the quantity 1 − δ depends on ǫ and on the
particular game G. When players implement the TE algorithm,
the notion of convergence largely differs from the classical
idea of convergence, that is, a dynamic distance minimization
with respect to a certain action profile (e.g., an NE, a correlated
equilibria, etc), indeed, once such a limiting action profile is
reached, the system remains static. The convergence of the
TE algorithm must be understood in terms of the time players
remain at a given action profile. Indeed, the system can be
at an NE, but it might arbitrarily leave it to experiment other
action profiles. Therefore, in this setting, convergence refers
to the fact that the system remains on certain action profiles
a large fraction of the time.
B. Enhanced Distribution and Settings
This section presents some enhancements to the TE algo-
rithm in order to improve its performance. In its standard
formulation, the TE learning algorithm [12] is characterized
by a time invariant ǫ and a uniform distribution over the whole
action set. Motivated by the fact that experimentations on the
set of channels brings higher instability than experimentations
on the set of power levels, the experimentation is divided into
two different steps. In detail, at each instant t, each player in a
content mood and denoted by k experiments with probability
ǫkc (t) a different channel and with probability ǫkp(t) a different
power level. The evolution of ǫkc (t) is given by:{
ǫkc (t) = max
(
ǫkc (t−1)
2 , ǫ
min
c
)
if
∑
n∈Lk
1{φn(a)>Γ} = |Lk|
ǫkc (t) = ǫ
k
c (0) otherwise. (8)
In (8), ǫminc > 0 represents the minimum experimentation
probability over the available channels and ǫkc (0) > ǫminc
represents the initial value. These parameters depend on the
particular configuration of the system. Through numerical
simulations, it has been found that some well-performing
values are: ǫminc = 0.01K and ǫ
k
c (0) = 0.01
C
K
. Since no prior
information is available on the channels’ gain, the experimen-
tation on the channels follows a uniform distribution.
Each player k experiments a different power level with
a constant probability ǫkp. Such a probability is a uni-
form distribution over all the levels greater than pk if∑
n∈Lk
1{φn(a)>Γ} < |Lk|, whereas it is uniformly dis-
tributed over all the levels smaller than pk, otherwise. Through
extensive simulations, it has been found that a well-performing
value is ǫkp = 0.01CK .
When a player k is discontent, it experiments according to
the following distribution:
{
pk(t) = Pmax with probability min
(
C
K
, 1
)
pk(t) = 0 with probability max
(
1− C
K
, 0
) .
(9)
The rationale behind this is that any discontent player needs
to test the network looking for a free channel. Clearly, the
probability of finding a free channel increases with C
K
. On
the other hand, in the case in which no channel is free for
transmission, zero power should be used to avoid wasting
energy and creating interference.
IV. CONVERGENCE STUDY
This section presents the main theoretical results of the
paper. A strong connection between the solutions of the
optimization problem in (1) and the NE of the game G is
established via the utility function (3).
A. Equilibrium points
Theorem 2 Let all the players of the game G implement the
TE algorithm with the utility function in (3), and let β ∈ R
satisfy β > K . Let also ANE be the set of NE of the game G
and assume it is non empty. Denote by λn the number of links
satisfied at the n-th NE, with n ∈ {1, . . . , |ANE|} and let Λ =
maxn∈{1,...,|ANE|} λn. Then, the TE algorithm is stochastically
stable in an NE in which there are at least Λ links that satisfy
their individual constraints.
Theorem 2 states that, if each player sets β > K , then the
stochastically stable points of the TE learning algorithm are
those NE with the largest possible number of links satisfying
their constraints. Here, β represents the trade-off between the
interest in satisfying the constraints for the largest set of links
and the maximization of the sum of the objective functions.
5The next theorem links this result with the global optimization
problem in (1).
Theorem 3 Let all the players of the game G implement the
TE learning algorithm with the utility function in (3), and
let β ∈ R satisfy β > K . Let A† ⊆ AK be the set of
solutions of the optimization problem in (1), and let L∗ be
the largest set such that ∃ a ∈ A† and ∀ℓ ∈ L∗, ξℓ(a) > Γ
and |L∗| = L∗. Let also ANE be the set of NE of the
game G, and assume ANE ∩ A† is non-empty. Then, the TE
algorithm is stochastically stable in an action profile a∗ such
that a∗ ∈ ANE ∩ A†.
Note that the set of solutions of (1) is non-empty as long
as there exists a set L∗ such that the optimization domain is
not an empty set. This theorem states that the stochastically
stable points of the TE algorithm are those NE that maximize
the sum of the network objective functions among the action
profiles that satisfy the constraints for the largest possible set
of links. For instance, if the network objective functions ϕk(·)
are decreasing with respect to the power level pk, then the
stochastically stable points are those NE which satisfy the
constraints for the largest number of links and minimize the
power consumption.
B. Convergence time
This section studies the convergence properties of the TE
algorithm in a particular scenario.
More specifically, the TE learning algorithm defines a large
discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) over the set of the states.
Studying the behavior of the algorithm on such a chain is a
difficult problem due to the number of states, transitions and
parameters. For this reason, a simplified version of the system
model introduced in Sec. II-B is considered. This allows the
estimation of the average number of time instants that are
required to reach an NE for the first time and the expected
fraction of time the system is at an NE action profile.
For the ease of the presentation, consider Lk = 1, i.e., each
cell possesses only one link. The functions ϕ and ξ are defined
as: {
ϕk(a) = 1−
pk
Pmax
ξk(a) = SINRk(a).
(10)
In this particular formulation, the aim is to minimize the
transmit power while keeping the SINR above a threshold Γ
for the largest number of links. In (10), since there is only
one link per cell, the link index is the same as the cell index.
Therefore the SINR of link k is evaluated as:
SINRk(a)=
pkg
(ck)
k,k
σ2+
∑
ℓ∈K\k
pℓg
(cℓ)
k,ℓ 1{cℓ=ck}
, (11)
where g(ck)k,ℓ indicates the channel power gain between the
transmitter of link k and the receiver of link ℓ over channel
ck; and σ2 represents the noise power. This problem has been
also studied in [33]. Note that it is possible for the receivers
to evaluate the SINR through pilots or training sequences. In
Tx Rx
k=1
k=2
k=K
Fig. 1. Simplified system model: symmetric parallel interference channel.
DEq C(K-1) C(K-2) C(0)
Fig. 2. Markov chain describing the TE learning algorithm in the network.
This model is used to study the convergence to the NE. The state Eq
represents an NE action profile. CK−k represents a state in which K − k
players are using an individually optimal action, D represents a state in which
at least one player is discontent.
the following, it is assumed that C ≥ K , and that the channel
gains follows the weak interference model as in [10]:{
g
(c)
k,k = 1 ∀k ∈ K and ∀c ∈ C
g
(c)
j,k =
1
2 ∀k ∈ K and ∀j ∈ K \ {k} and ∀c ∈ C
. (12)
In the light of the description made in Sec. III, if the number
of players K is large enough the following can be stated:
(i) the fraction of time player k is either at watchful or
hopeful state is negligible compared to the fraction of time
it spends in discontent or content state; (ii) at any time,
the probability of having more than one player discontent is
significantly lower than the probability of having only one or
no discontent player. In fact, in (7) the probability of accepting
the outcome of the experimentation for a player which is
discontent is close to one, moreover players do not adopt a
watchful or hopeful state for more than one iteration. Sec. V
shows that these results are good approximations under less
restrictive conditions as well.
Under these conditions, the resulting DTMC for studying
the TE learning algorithm is represented in Fig. 2.
In this figure, the final state represents an NE, the states
labeled with CK−k are those in which K − k players use an
individually optimal action and D a state in which one player
is discontent. The transition probabilities are listed hereafter
(the reasoning behind these transition probabilities is given in
the appendix):
P (N,D) = K(K−1)
2ǫ2
C2
(
Q−1
Q
)2
(13)
P (D,N) = (C−K+1)
CQ
(14)
P (D,CK−k) =
(C−K+k)
Ck
(K−1)!
(K−k)! (15)
P (CK−k, CK−k−1) = (K − k)
C−k
CQ
ǫ. (16)
Here, P (N,D) is the transition probability between an NE and
a state in which one player is discontent; P (D,N) is transition
6probability between a state in which one player is discontent
and an NE; P (D,CK−k) is the transition probability between
a state in which one player is discontent and a state in which
K − k players are using an individually optimal action; and
P (CK−k, CK−k−1) is the transition probability between a
state in which K−k players are using an individually optimal
action and a state in which K−k−1 are doing the same. The
analysis of this DTMC leads to state the following theorems.
Theorem 4 Let K , C, Q, and ǫ be the number of players,
the number of channels, the number of power levels and the
experimentation parameter respectively. Assume C ≥ K . Let
Lk = 1 and let the channel power gains be given by (12).
Then, if all players implement the TE learning algorithm, the
expected number of iterations needed to reach the NE for the
first time, T¯NE , is bounded as follows:
T¯NE ≤
CQ
ǫ (C −K)
(
1 + log
(
K (C −K + 1)
C + 1
))
(17)
T¯NE ≥
CQ
ǫ (C −K)
(
γ + log
(
K (C −K)
C
))
; (18)
where, γ ≃ 0.577 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
Note that the time needed to visit for the first time an NE
is directly proportional to the dimension of the action set (i.e.,
|A| = CQ) and inversely proportional to the experimentation
probability ǫ.
Theorem 5 Let K , C, Q, and ǫ be the number of players,
the number of channels, the number of power levels and
the experimentation parameter, respectively. Assume C ≥ K ,
Lk = 1, and let also the channel power gains follow (12).
Then, if all players follow the TE learning algorithm the
expected fraction of time the system is at an NE is:
(1 − δ) ≈
1
1 + P (N,D)TBNE
, (19)
where
TBNE ≈
K∑
k=1
P (D,CK−k)TCNE(k) +
P (D,N)
(1− P (D,D))2
,
TCNE(k) ≈
CQ
ǫ (C −K)
(
γ + log
(
K (C − k + 1)
C + 1
))
,
P (D,D) = 1− P (D,N)−
K∑
k=1
P (D,CK−k).
Note that the frequency of using an NE, i.e., (1− δ) depends
on 1
ǫ2
as in (13). This means that the larger the ǫ the shorter
the time the system is at an NE. The approximation is given
by the fact that TBNE is replaced by its upper bound.
These theorems show that the stability of the TE algorithm
and the time it needs to visit an NE for the first time are
influenced by the experimentation probability. Lower values
increase stability while higher values increase the speed of
convergence.
Fig. 3. A 5 km × 5 km square field divided into K = 16 cells. Nodes are
positioned randomly inside each cells.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides numerical evaluations of all results
presented in this paper. To implement these simulations, two
scenarios are considered and reported in Figure 1 and Figure
3, respectively.
A. Numerical Validation
Theorems 4 and 5 allow the calculation of the fraction
of time the system uses an NE and the average number of
iterations needed before visiting the NE for the first time, as a
function of several design parameters when the channel gains
follow (12). The following shows that these results also hold
under a more general formulation.
All experiments presented here are run on the scenario
represented in Figure 1, with two different sets of parameters.
The first set is composed of: K = 3, C = 4, ǫ = 0.02
and 6 ≤ Q ≤ 10; the second one is composed of K = 4,
C = 5, ǫ = 0.02 and 6 ≤ Q ≤ 10. In the first experiment,
the fraction of time the system uses an NE is estimated by
running 107 iterations under two different channel models: the
simple channels expressed in (12) and a channel power gain
randomly drawn from a Rayleigh distribution. These results
are summarized in Fig. 4. The dashed line and the continuous
line correspond to the theoretical results with the first and
the second set of parameters respectively. The results of the
simulations are close to the lines for both channel models.
In the second experiment, the number of iterations needed
to visit an NE for the first time is estimated and compared with
the analytical results in Fig.5. Increasing the dimension of the
action set, i.e., increasing C or Q, brings slower convergence
rates since the algorithm requires more time to explore all the
possibilities.
B. Convergence Nash Equilibrium
The following shows the effect of the enhancement on the
stability and in the speed of the algorithm in reaching any
7Fig. 4. Fraction of time the system is at the NE, with the TE learning
algorithm, ǫ = 0.01 and uniform probability distribution over the action set.
Theoretical results are represented by the continuous lines, simulation results
are represented by the markers for two sets of data and different channels:
Rayleigh and the model in (12).
Fig. 5. Number of iterations needed for the algorithm to visit an NE for
the first time. Simulations run with the standard TE, ǫ = 0.01 and uniform
probability distribution on the actions set. The continuous lines represent (17),
the dashed lines represent (18).
stochastically stable point. A total of 104 iterations of TE are
run with an underlying network as the one depicted in Figure
3, with K = 4 cells each populated with one link, C = 4
channels, Q = 5 power levels and a target SINR of Γ = 10 dB.
In Fig. 6 the probability with which the TE algorithm selects
an NE as a network action profile is plotted as a function of
the experimentation probabilities ǫp and ǫminc . Reducing the
minimum experimentation probability on the channel sensibly
decreases the instability of the system and thus increases the
probability of the system of being at the NE. On the other
hand, the stabilizing effect of reducing the experimentation
probability on the power levels is balanced by the longer time
that is needed for the system to reach an NE, as showed in
Fig.7. In this figure, the number of iterations used by the TE
learning algorithm to reach, for the first time, an NE is plotted
as a function of the experimentation probabilities ǫp and ǫminc .
Note that, the number of iterations needed to reach for the
first time an NE represents also a measure of the speed of the
algorithm to reach again an NE, once it is left. From a real-
system implementation point of view, it is also an estimation
of the ability of the algorithm to react to network changes
that modify the NE set, e.g. fading, shadowing, mobility, etc.
By inspecting both plots, it appears that the experimentation
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Fig. 6. The plot represents the probability of observing the TE learning
algorithm selecting an action profile which is an NE as a function of ǫp and
ǫminc . The underlying network is composed of K = 4 cells, Lk = 1 links per
cell, C = 4 channels and Q = 5 power levels. The ǫminc values are reported
in logarithmic scale.
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Fig. 7. The plot represents the number of iterations between t = 0 and the
instant in which an NE is played for the first time as a function of ǫp and
ǫminc . The underlying network is the same as in Fig. 6.
frequency on the power levels should be relatively high, while
the one on the channels should be relatively low with the
exact optimal values depending on the other parameters of the
network.
C. Performance Metrics
The following metrics are considered to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed algorithm:
• Average satisfaction (AS): The average number of times
a link satisfies its SINR constraints.
8Fig. 8. The upper plot represents the AS, the lower plot represents the APC.
• Average power consumption (APC): The average power
used by the transmitters in a cell to achieve the corre-
sponding satisfaction level.
• Average satisfaction over average used power ratio: This
metric establishes the ability of the algorithm in satisfying
the constraints with respect to the average power used.
The simulation scenario is represented in Fig. 3. Consider
a static network composed of K = 16 cells each with Nk = 4
links, C = 10 channels, and the maximum power Pmax =
50W is quantized in Q = 8 logarithmic levels. The results
are reported in Fig. 8, where the upper plot represents the AS
while the lower plot shows the APC. The figure shows that
the TE algorithm is able to drive the network to an almost
full satisfaction by averagely employing only 10W. Note that,
even though the first visit to an NE may happen quite late, the
global performance at non-equilibrium states is high. This is
due to the fact that the probability of playing an action grows
with the social welfare of the action itself [32]. Second, Fig. 8
shows that even when an equilibrium is achieved, the system
sometimes attempts to use sub-optimal action profiles. This is
due to the stochastic nature of the TE learning algorithm. Note
that there exist a natural tradeoff between the time needed to
visit an NE and stability of such an equilibrium. In order to
decrease the time needed to visit an NE, the experimentation
probability needs to be large while, in order to improve the
stability it needs to be small.
Furthermore, the TE learning algorithm is compared with
the greedy based decentralized algorithm (GBDCA) described
in [14]. Briefly, this algorithm solves the graph-coloring prob-
lem, by letting each CC detect the channel employed by its
neighbors. If a CC detects that it is using a channel already
occupied by one of its neighbors then it chooses randomly
another channel among the free ones. If no channel is free,
then it does not change its strategy. Since this algorithm does
not consider a power allocation policy, its transmission power
is set to Pmax. In this context, the GBDCA is compared with
the TE learning algorithm when the quantization levels are
reduced to Q = 2, i.e., an ON-OFF policy. The results, in
Fig. 9. Performance comparison between TE and the GBDCA in terms of
average number of constraints satisfied over average used power. The dashed
line is the performance of TE and the continuous line the one of GBDCA.
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Fig. 10. Performance comparison between TE (red continuous line), the
synchronous IWF (dotted line) and the global optimum (dashed line). We
represent, in the upper plot, the AS, in the lower plot, the APC. We run 400
iterations of each algorithm on a network composed of K = 16 cells, each
populated with one link, C = 5 channels, Q = 5 power levels, a maximum
available power of Pmax = 50W.
terms of the ratio
∑
ℓ∈L
1{ξℓ>Γ}∑
k∈Kpk
are reported in Fig.9. The TE
learning algorithm allows the cells that cannot satisfy their
constraints to stop the transmission for a short period of time,
which increases the efficiency.
The following compares the performance of the TE learning
algorithm with the one of synchronous IWF and the global
optimum. Consider K = 16 cells, Nk = 1 link per cell,
C = 5 channels, Q = 5 power levels and a target SINR
Γ = 10 dB. In the synchronous IWF each transmitter has
full knowledge of the transmit channel state information; each
transmitter may exploit multiple channels; the power allocation
routine happen at the same instant for all transmitters; and each
transmitter attempts to achieve a transmission rate equal to
log2 (1 + Γ) with the minimum necessary power. The results
9of the experiment are reported in Fig. 10.
The first figure reports the AS in the upper plot and the APC
in the lower plot. In these plots, the dashed line represents
the global optimum, the continuous red line the performance
of TE algorithm and the dotted line the performance of the
synchronous IWF. The action profiles chosen by the TE algo-
rithm approach the global optimum both in terms of constraints
satisfaction and in terms of power drain. The synchronous
IWF, even though it is allowed to exploit a larger amount of
information, is not able to select an action that satisfies the
constraints for a large proportion of the links.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, strong connections between the solutions to
a centralized network optimization problem and the Nash
equilibria of a given game has been established via the design
of the corresponding utility functions. More specifically, it has
been shown that by properly choosing the utility function, it
is possible to make a decentralized network to be stable at a
global optimal operating point. More importantly, it has been
shown that such equilibria can also be achieved by using learn-
ing algorithms following the paradigm of trial and error. The
intuitions on the utility function design as well as the relevance
of the trial and error learning are shown using the the scenario
of a decentralized multi-channel ad hoc network. Using this
network model, some heuristic enhancements have been also
presented to improve the convergence of the algorithm and
theoretical bounds on the time to reach an equilibrium are
formally proved.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Consider two arbitrary NE a∗ and a+ ∈ ANE,
such that
∑
ℓ∈L 1{ξ(a∗)>Γ} = L
∗
,
∑
ℓ∈L 1{ξ(a+)>Γ} = L
+
with L∗ ≥ L++1. From Theorem 1, the stochastically stable
points of the TE algorithm are the NE that maximize the
social welfare W . Therefore, proving the thesis is equivalent
to proving that W (a∗) > W (a+).
The social welfare associated with a∗ using the utility in
(3) is
W (a∗) =
∑
k∈K
uk(a
∗)
=
∑
k∈K
1
1 + βLmax
(
ϕk(a
∗) + β
∑
ℓ∈Lk
1{ξi(a∗)>Γ}
)
=
1
1 + βLmax
(
βL∗ +
K∑
k=1
ϕk(a
∗)
)
. (20)
Since ϕk is a non-negative function, it holds that
W (a∗) ≥
βL∗
1 + βLmax
. (21)
Analogously, the social welfare associated with a+ is
W (a+) =
∑
k∈K
uk(a
+)
=
∑
k∈K
1
1 + βLmax

ϕk(a+) + β ∑
ℓ∈Lk
1{ξi(a+)>Γ}


=
1
1 + βLmax
(
βL
+ +
K∑
k=1
ϕk(a
+)
)
. (22)
By definition, ∀ a ∈ AK , and ∀ k ∈ K, ϕk(a) ≤ 1 and
thus W (a+) ≤ βL
++K
1+βLmax
. Then, using the assumption that
L+ ≤ L∗ − 1, it holds that
W (a+) ≤
βL∗ − β +K
1 + βLmax
.
Therefore, from the assumption that β > K it is possible to
write
βL∗ − β +K
1 + βLmax
<
βL∗
1 + βLmax
, (23)
thus, following the chain of inequalities, it holds that
W (a+) < W (a∗). This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: From the assumptions of Theorem 3, the inter-
section between the set of NE ANE and the set of solu-
tions of (1) A† is non empty, i.e., ANE ∩ A† 6= ∅. Let
a
∗ ∈ ANE ∩ A† be an arbitrary element of the intersection
and L∗ =
∑
ℓ∈L 1{ξ(a∗)>Γ} the number of links that satisfy
their constraints. Since a∗ ∈ A† it results that L∗ =
max
a∈AK
∑
ℓ∈L 1{ξ(a)>Γ}, i.e., L∗ is the maximum number
of links that can simultaneously satisfy their constraints. From
Theorem 1, the set of the stochastically stable action profiles
is ATE =
{
a
′
∈ AK : a
′
∈ argmaxa∈ANE W (a)
}
. Hence,
proving the theorem is equivalent to prove that ATE ⊆(
ANE ∩ A†
)
. From its definition ATE ⊆ ANE, thus it remains
to prove that ATE ⊆ A†.
Let A⋆ ⊆ ANE be the set of NE such that ∀ a ∈
A⋆
∑
ℓ∈L 1{ξℓ(a)>Γ} = L
∗
. Then, it results that ∀ a+ ∈
AK \ A⋆ it hold that
∑
ℓ∈L 1{ξℓ(a+)>Γ} < L
∗
. Thus, from
Theorem 2 and the assumption that β > K , it holds that
W (a+) < W (a), ∀ a+ ∈
(
AK \ A⋆
)
and ∀ a ∈ A⋆. There-
fore the set of stochastically stable points can be expressed as
ATE =
{
a
′
∈ AK : a
′
∈ argmaxa∈A⋆ W (a)
}
. The social
welfare of the action profiles on A⋆ is:
W (a) = βL∗ +
K∑
k=1
ϕk(a). (24)
Therefore, argmaxa∈A⋆ W (a) =
argmaxa∈A⋆
∑K
k=1 ϕk(a). Thus, ATE is the set of the
action profiles that satisfy the constraints for L∗ links and
maximizes the
∑K
k=1 ϕk(a), hence ATE ⊆ A†.
This concludes our proof.
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APPENDIX C
MARKOV CHAIN TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
A. Transition probability from an NE to a discontent state
The transition probability between an NE state and a state
with one discontent player is denoted by P (N,D). For the
system to exit an NE, a player must pass from a content to
a discontent state. This happens only in the following case:
at time t player k experiments and during this experimen-
tation k interferes with enough power to turn player l into
watchful, at time (t + 1) player m experiments and during
this experimentation m interferes turning l into discontent.
The probability of at least one player experimenting in the
system is given by: Pǫ = 1 − (1− ǫ)K . By using the first
two terms (reasonable since ǫ ≪ 1 implies ǫN ≪ ǫ(N−1))
of the binomial expansion (1 + (−ǫ))K =
∑K
k=0
(
K
k
)
(−ǫ)k
it holds that Pǫ ≃ Kǫ. The probability that the player k
disturbs another one, say l, is given by: (a) the probability
of choosing an already occupied channel multiplied by (b) the
probability of selecting a power level high enough. As a worst
case scenario, assume that any power level greater than first
quantization level is enough to create an intolerable level of
interference. Thus, this probability is given by:
Pd =
K − 1
C︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
(Q− 1)
Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
. (25)
The probability that a player different from l experiments is
(K − 1)ǫ, the probability of choosing the channel employed
by l is 1
C
and the probability of selecting a power level high
enough is again given by (25). Therefore,
P (N,D) = Kǫ (K−1)
C
(Q−1)
Q
(K − 1)ǫ 1
C
(Q−1)
Q
(26)
= K(K−1)
2ǫ2
C2
(
Q−1
Q
)2
. (27)
B. Transition probability from discontent state to an NE
Here, we aim at evaluating P (D,N), i.e., the transition
probability between a state in which one player is discon-
tent and a state in which all players are at the NE. Therefore,
one player is performing a noisy search. Thus, the probability
of immediately returning to an NE is given by: (a) the
probability of selecting a free channel times (b) the probability
of selecting enough power. Thus, we obtain:
P (D,N) =
C − (K − 1)
C︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
1
Q︸︷︷︸
(b)
. (28)
C. Transition probability from a discontent state to a content
state
The transition probability from a state with one discon-
tent player to a state in which K−k players are employing an
individually optimal action is denoted by P (D,CK−k). The
discontent player selects a random action, then the probability
of quitting the discontent state to a state in which only (K−k)
players are using one of their individually optimal actions
depends on the acceptance function F (u). Given (7) and for K
large enough, the accepting probability can be approximated
by ǫF (u) ≈ 1. When a player is discontent, it is possible for
it to accept as a benchmark action the one that makes another
player to change into a discontent mood. Then, the transition
probability towards state CK−k is given by the product of the
probability of disturbing (k − 1) players that were at an NE
before selecting a free channel or a channel used by a player
that is not at an NE. The probability of colliding with k − 1
players is given by
(K − 1)
C
(K − 2)
C
(K − 3)
C
...
(K − k + 1)
C
=
(K − 1)!
Ck−1 (K − k)!
,
(29)
while the probability of selecting a channel free or used by a
player not using an individually optimal action is C−(K−k)
C
.
Therefore, the product is:
P (D,CK−k) =
1
Ck
(K − 1)!
(K − k)!
(C −K + k) . (30)
D. Transition probability from CK−k to CK−k+1
The transition probability between a state in which K − k
players are using an individually optimal action and a state in
which K − k + 1 players are using an individually optimal
action is denoted by P (CK−k, CK−k+1). Since no player
is discontent, the transition happens through experimentation.
To pass from a state in which K − k players are using an
individually optimal action to another one in which K−k+1
are doing the same, the following sequence of events must
happen: at least one of the K − k players experiments; it
selects one of the available individually optimal actions; and
it accepts the action. Thus, the transition probability is
P (CK−k, CK−k+1) = (K − k)ǫ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
C − k
CQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
ǫG(∆u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
(31)
= (K − k)
C − k
CQ
ǫ1+G(∆u). (32)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: With a standard Markov chain analysis, starting
from state C0, the expected number of iterations before
reaching for the first time the NE is given by: T¯NE =∑K−1
k=0
1
P (CK−k,CK−k+1)
. Substituting, we obtain
T¯NE =
CQ
ǫ(1+G(∆u))
K−1∑
k=0
1
(K − k) (C − k)
=
CQ
ǫ(1+G(∆u)) (C −K)
K−1∑
k=0
(
1
K − k
−
1
C − k
)
.(33)
Given (6) and the fact that ǫ≪ 1, the following approximation
holds ǫ(1+G(∆u)) ≈ ǫ. For the sake of simplicity, in the
following, the pre-multiplying constant factor is omitted and
define m = K − k. Thus, equation (33) can be written as
K∑
m=1
(
1
m
−
1
C −K +m
)
. (34)
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It is known that
∑K
m=1
1
m
< 1 +
∫K
1
1
x
dx thus:
K∑
m=1
1
m
≤ log (K) + 1. (35)
It is also known that the harmonic sum is such that
K∑
m=1
1
m
≥ log (K) + γ. (36)
Consider that ∀n ≥ 1, with K ∈ N and A ∈ N,∫ K+1
n
1
A+ x
dx <
K∑
m=n
1
A+m
<
∫ K
n−1
1
A+ x
dx, (37)
and thus, for the second addend it holds that:
K∑
m=1
1
C −K +m
≤ log
(
C
C −K
)
, (38)
K∑
m=1
1
C −K +m
≥ log
(
C + 1
C −K + 1
)
. (39)
By joining together equation (35) with (38) and (36) with
(39), and by reinserting the omitted multiplicative factor, we
obtain the result, and this concludes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof: The average fraction of time the system is at an
NE can be expressed as (1− δ) = TN
TTOT
, where T¯N is the
expected time spent at an NE once it has been reached and by
TTOT the total time spent in all the states. Given the DTMC
in Fig. 2, this can be expressed as
TTOT = T¯N + TBNE, (40)
where T¯BNE denotes the expected time between the instant
the system leaves an NE and the instant it reaches it again.
The expected number of time steps needed to leave the NE
once reached is
T¯N =
∞∑
n=1
nP (NE,D)(1− P (NE,D))(n−1)
= −P (NE,D) d
dP (NE,D)
∞∑
n=1
(1− P (NE,D))n
= −P (NE,D) d
dP (NE,D)
(
1
P (NE,D)
)
= 1
P (NE,D) .
Here, the well known equality
∑∞
n=1 x
n = x1−x has been used
and
∑∞
n=1 nx
(n−1) = d
dx
∑∞
n=1 x
n
. Thus, it follows that
(1− δ) =
1
1 + P (NE,D)TBNE
. (41)
To evaluate TBNE , the process is as follows. The starting state
on the Markov chain is the state D. From here, it is possible
to go back to the NE state without quitting the discontent
state. To do this, the expected number of time steps needed is
T(D,NE) =
∑∞
n=1 nP (D,N)P (D,D)
(n−1)
. These equalities
imply the following
T(D,NE) =
P (D,NE)
(1− P (D,D))2
, (42)
where P (D,D) is easily obtained by imposing the sum of the
probabilities to be equal to 1:
P (D,D) = 1−
(
P (D,NE) +
K∑
k=1
P (D,CK−k)
)
. (43)
On the other hand, it is possible to transit from the discontent
state to a certain CK−k state and the expected time steps
needed to return to the NE starting from state CK−k is denoted
by TCNE(k). This quantity can be upper-bounded by using
(37):
TCNE(k) ≤
CQ
ǫ1+G(∆u) (C −K)
(
γ + log
(
K (C − k + 1)
C + 1
))
.
(44)
In the following, this upper bound is used as a close enough
approximation of the true value. Moreover, given (6), and ǫ≪
1, it follows that ǫ1+G(∆u) ≈ ǫ. As consequence, the expected
time TBNE to return to an NE when the system deviates is
given by:
TBNE = T(D,NE) +
K∑
k=1
P (D,CK−k)TCNE(k). (45)
This concludes the proof.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research work was carried out in the framework of the
CORASMA EDA Project B-0781-IAP4-GC.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Hoydis, M. Kobayashi, and M. Debbah, “Green small-cell networks,”
IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 37–43, Mar.
2011.
[2] W. Kiess and M. Mauve, “A survey on real-world implementations of
mobile ad-hoc networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 324–339,
Apr. 2007.
[3] L. Rose, S. Lasaulce, S. M. Perlaza, and M. Debbah, “Learning
equilibria with partial information in decentralized wireless networks,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 49, no. 8, pp. 136–142, Aug.
2011.
[4] I. Macaluso, L. D. Silva, and L. Doyle, “Learning Nash equilibria
in distributed channel selection for frequency-agile radios,” in Proc.
Workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Telecommunications and Sensors
Networks (WAITS), Montpellier, France, Apr. 2012.
[5] Y. Xu, A. Anpalagan, Q. Wu, L. Shen, Z. Gao, and J. Wang, “Decision-
theoretic distributed channel selection for opportunistic spectrum access:
Strategies, challenges and solutions,” IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials, vol. 1, no. 99, pp. 1–25, Apr. 2013.
[6] D. Gesbert, S. Kiani, A. Gjendemsjo, and G. ien, “Adaptation, coordina-
tion, and distributed resource allocation in interference-limited wireless
networks,” Proc. the IEEE, vol. 95, no. 12, pp. 2393–2409, Dec. 2007.
[7] Y. Xu, J. Wang, Q. Wu, A. Anpalagan, and Y.-D. Yao, “Opportunistic
spectrum access in cognitive radio networks: Global optimization using
local interaction games,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal
Processing, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 180–194, Apr. 2012.
[8] C. Tekin, M. Liu, R. Southwell, J. Huang, and S. Ahmad, “Atomic
congestion games on graphs and their applications in networking,” IEEE
ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 1541–1552, Oct.
2012.
12
[9] R. D. Yates, D. Tse, and Z. Li, “Secret communication on interference
channels,” in Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), Toronto, Canada, Jul. 2008.
[10] R. Berry and D. Tse, “Shannon meets nash on the interference channel,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 2821–
2836, May 2011.
[11] S. M. Perlaza, R. Tandon, H. V. Poor, and Z. Han, “The Nash equilibrium
region of the linear deterministic interference channel with feedback,”
in Proc. 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communications, Control,
and Computing, Monticello, IL, Oct. 2012.
[12] H. P. Young, “Learning by trial and error,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 626–643, Mar. 2009.
[13] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge, MA, USA: The
MIT Press, 1991.
[14] T.-C. Hou and T.-J. Tsai, “On the cluster based dynamic channel
assignment for multihop ad hoc networks,” Journal of Communications
and Networks, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 40–47, Mar. 2002.
[15] J.-S. Pang, G. Scutari, D. P. Palomar, and F. Facchinei, “Design of
cognitive radio systems under temperature-interference constraints: A
variational inequality approach,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Process-
ing, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 3251–3271, Jun. 2010.
[16] V. L. Nir and B. Scheers, “Improved coexistence between multiple
cognitive tactical radio networks by an expert rule based on sub-channel
selection,” in Proc. Wireless Innovation Forum European Conference
on Communications Technologies and Software Defined Radio SDR’11
(WInnComm-Europe), Brussels, Belgium, Jun. 2011.
[17] V. Le Nir and B. Scheers, “Autonomous dynamic spectrum management
for coexistence of multiple cognitive tactical radio networks,” in Proc.
IEEE Fifth International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented
Wireless Networks Communications (CROWNCOM), Cannes, France,
Jun. 2010.
[18] Y. Xu, J. Wang, Q. Wu, A. Anpalagan, and Y.-D. Yao, “Opportunistic
spectrum access in unknown dynamic environment: A game-theoretic
stochastic learning solution,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communi-
cations,, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 1380–1391, Apr. 2012.
[19] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Cognitive radio for next-generation wireless
networks: An approach to opportunistic channel selection in IEEE
802.11-based wireless mesh,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Commu-
nications, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 46–54, Feb. 2009.
[20] K. Liu and Q. Zhao, “Distributed learning in multi-armed bandit with
multiple players,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 58,
no. 11, pp. 5667–5681, Nov. 2010.
[21] P. Sastry, V. Phansalkar, and M. Thathachar, “Decentralized learning
of Nash equilibria in multi-person stochastic games with incomplete
information,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,
vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 769–777, May 1994.
[22] V. Belmega, S. Lasaulce, M. Debbah, and A. Hjorungnes, “Learning
Distributed Power Allocation Policies in MIMO Channels,” in Proc. Eu-
ropean Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), Aalborg, Denmark,
Aug. 2010.
[23] Y. Xing and R. Chandramouli, “Stochastic learning solution for dis-
tributed discrete power control game in wireless data networks,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 932–944,
Aug. 2008.
[24] O. Popescu and C. Rose, “Water filling may not good neighbors make,”
in Proc. IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM),
San Francisco, CA, USA, Dec. 2003.
[25] L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, and M. Debbah, “On the Nash equilibria in
decentralized parallel interference channels,” in Proc. IEEE Workshop
on Game Theory and Resource Allocation for 4G, Kyoto, Japan, Jun.
2011.
[26] E. Altman, V. Kumar, and H. Kameda, “A Braess type paradox in power
control over interference channels,” in Proc. 6th Intl. Symp. on Modeling
and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOPT),
Berlin, Germany, Apr. 2008.
[27] W. Yu and R. Lui, “Dual methods for nonconvex spectrum optimiza-
tion of multicarrier systems,” IEEE Transactions on Communications,
vol. 54, no. 7, pp. 1310–1322, Jul. 2006.
[28] R. Cendrillon, J. Huang, M. Chiang, and M. Moonen, “Autonomous
spectrum balancing for digital subscriber lines,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 55, no. 8, pp. 4241–4257, Aug. 2007.
[29] R. Cendrillon, W. Yu, M. Moonen, J. Verlinden, and T. Bostoen,
“Optimal multiuser spectrum balancing for digital subscriber lines,”
IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 922–933,
May 2006.
[30] M. Bennis, S. M. Perlaza, P. Blasco, Z. Han, and H. V. Poor, “Self-
organization in small cell networks: A reinforcement learning approach,”
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 12, no. 7, pp.
3202–3212, Jun. 2013.
[31] H. P. Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits (Arne Ryde Memorial
Lectures Sereis). Oxford University Press, USA, 2004.
[32] B. S. Pradelski and H. P. Young, “Learning efficient Nash equilibria in
distributed systems,” Tech. Rep., Sep. 2010.
[33] L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, M. Debbah, and C. L. Martret, “Distributed
power allocation with SINR constraints using trial and error learning,”
in Proc. IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference
(WCNC), Paris, France, Apr. 2012.
[34] J. F. Nash, “Equilibrium points in n-person games,” Proc. the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 36, no. 1,
pp. 48–49, 1950.
Luca Rose (S’10) was born in Pisa, Italy. He
received his B.Sc. degree in telecommunications
engineering from the University of Pisa, Italy. In
2009 he received his M.Sc. degree with honours
from the same university. Since 2010, he has been
attending his PhD studies on Game theory and
Learning theory as a member of the Alcatel-Lucent
chair in flexible radio in Supe´lec, sponsored by
Thales Communications & Security. Furthermore, he
holds a position as research engineer in Thales in
the context of the project CORASMA (COgnitive
RAdio for dynamic Spectrum MAnagement). His interests span from the field
of software radio to the field of Game theory and Learning theory, small cells,
and distributed resource allocation.
Samir M. Perlaza (M’13) received the B.Sc. degree
from Universidad del Cauca, Popaya´n, Colombia,
in 2005 and the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from
´Ecole Nationale Supe´rieure des Te´le´communications
(Telecom ParisTech), Paris, France, in 2008 and
2011, respectively. From 2008 to 2011, he held a
position as a Research Engineer at France Te´le´com
(Orange Labs, Paris, France) and during the second
half of 2011 he was with the Alcatel Lucent Chair in
Flexible Radio, Gif-sur-Yvette, France. Since 2012,
he is a Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the
Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
His research interests lie in the overlap of signal processing, information
theory, game theory and wireless communications. Dr. Perlaza was a recipient
of an Alβan Fellowship of the European Union in 2006 and the Best Student
Paper Award in Crowncom in 2009.
Christophe J. Le Martret (SM’06) was born in
Rennes, France, on March 12, 1963. He received the
Ph.D. degree in Signal Processing and Communica-
tions from l’Universit de Rennes 1, Rennes, France,
in 1990 and the HDR (Habilitation Diriger des
Recherches) degree in 2010 and qualification for full
professorship in 2012. From 1991 to 1995 he was
with the CESTA, Bruz, France, and from 1996 to
2002 with the Centre d’lectronique de L’ARmement
(CELAR). In 2002 he joined the Signal Processing
and Multimedia Department at Thales Communi-
cations France. He was a Visiting Researcher at the SpinCom Laboratory,
Department of ECE, University of Minnesota, MN, from 1999 to 2000.
He holds a Thales Expert position since 2007 in the field of wireless
communications. Its current research activities cover radio access design with
cross-layer optimization for ad hoc mobile networks, and cognitive radio.
13
Me´rouane Debbah (SM’08) entered the Ecole Nor-
male Supe´rieure de Cachan (France) in 1996 where
he received his M.Sc and Ph.D. degrees respectively.
He worked for Motorola Labs (Saclay, France) from
1999-2002 and the Vienna Research Center for
Telecommunications (Vienna, Austria) until 2003.
He then joined the Mobile Communications de-
partment of the Institut Eurecom (Sophia Antipo-
lis, France) as an Assistant Professor until 2007.
He is now a Full Professor at Supelec (Gif-sur-
Yvette, France), holder of the Alcatel-Lucent Chair
on Flexible Radio and a recipient of the ERC starting grant MORE (Advanced
Mathematical Tools for Complex Network Engineering). His research interests
are in information theory, signal processing and wireless communications.
He is a senior area editor for IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing and
an Associate Editor in Chief of the journal Random Matrix: Theory and
Applications. Me´rouane Debbah is the recipient of the ”Mario Boella” award
in 2005, the 2007 General Symposium IEEE GLOBECOM best paper award,
the Wi-Opt 2009 best paper award, the 2010 Newcom++ best paper award, the
WUN CogCom Best Paper 2012 and 2013 Award as well as the Valuetools
2007, Valuetools 2008, Valuetools 2012 and CrownCom2009 best student
paper awards. He is a WWRF fellow and an elected member of the academic
senate of Paris-Saclay. In 2011, he received the IEEE Glavieux Prize Award.
He is the co-founder of Ximinds.
